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Nation-building or state-making? India’s North-East Frontier and the Ambiguities of 
Nehruvian Developmentalism, 1950-1959 
 
Bérénice Guyot-Réchard 
Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK 
 
 
Few Indian regions evoke political, economic, and cultural marginalisation as much as North-East 
India. Solutions to its political instability often assume that, provided the vicious circle of under-
development and violence can be broken, the region will eventually build a stable relationship 
with the Indian nation-state. This understanding in turns rests on a long intellectual genealogy 
that associates development with the state and the nation. By examining development schemes in 
the North-East Frontier Agency (today's Arunachal Pradesh) in the 1950-60s, a hitherto scarcely 
administered region where these were the primary mode of state-building, this paper cautions 
against the tendency to see the Indian state's developmental ambitions as an instrument of nation-
building. Instead it argues that, in North-East India at least, state-building and nation-building 
have not historically gone together, and that developmentalism played an important part in this 
rupture. On the ground, tribal development did little for NEFA's integration into the Indian 
nation. In fact, state-building processes resulted in the disintegration of the links that had tied 
NEFA with its regional hinterland in India. In the process, some of the seeds of tensions plaguing 
today's Northeast India were planted. 
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Introduction 
 
Few Indian regions evoke political, economic, and cultural marginalisation as much as North-
East India. In proposing solutions to its 'durable disorder' (Baruah 2007a), scholars and policy-
makers often assume that, provided the vicious circle of under-development and violence can be 
broken, the region will eventually build a stable, positive relationship with the Indian nation-state 
(Planning Commission 1997; MDONER 2008; Barua 2005; Roy, Miri, and Goswami 2007).1  
These arguments participate in a long intellectual genealogy of 'developmental nationalism', in 
which nation, state, and development are deeply intertwined (Desai 2008a, 2008b). The historical 
emergence of nationalism was rooted in the experience and the contestation of the dynamics of 
imperial capitalism and the uneven development on which it rests (Nairn 1977). Indeed, in India 
itself, the earliest incarnations of nationalism were articulated not around the celebration of 
national culture but around a systematic economic critique of colonial rule, deemed responsible 
for the dislocation of India's society and economy and its mass poverty (Goswami 2004; Sarkar 
2008).  In this light, the attainment of freedom meant not merely putting an end to colonial rule, 
but also establishing a new political economy — a political economy that would unleash India's 
productive forces and create an egalitarian society, and hence throw the bases of a (re-)forged 
Indian nation (Desai 2008b).  From the 1930s onwards, 'development' — interlinked with ideas 
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1 The Central government has in fact created a ministry specifically dedicated to the development of 
North-East India, the Ministry of Development of North-Eastern Region (MDONER).  
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of self-government and progress — therefore became central to mainstream visions of 
independent India. In the search for a specifically Indian path of development, the concept 
eventually coalesced around ideas of socialism, national discipline, and science (Zachariah 2005, 
211).  
State involvement was taken to be central to this developmental nationalism, for only the state 
had the capacity and reach to create a national political economy and to forge a united society. It 
was not merely that ‘national backwardness and lack’ required and legitimised state intervention 
in the economy; the state itself was represented as ‘a subject of needs’ (Roy 2007, 110). Building 
the state and building the nation therefore appeared to go hand in hand (Desai 2005; Roy 2007). 
This paper cautions against this tendency to forget the 'hyphen between nation and state' 
(Ishikawa 2010, 3) and to see the Indian state's developmental ambitions as an instrument of 
nation-building. In North-East India at least, state-building and nation-building have not 
historically gone together, and developmentalism was a big factor in this rupture. This paper 
demonstrates this by looking at a region where, during the Nehruvian period, development was 
the primary mode of state-building: the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), today the state of 
Arunachal Pradesh.  
Faced with the persisting impossibility of enforcing law and order and territorial control on the 
hitherto scarcely administered frontier, NEFA authorities — who responded not to the Assam 
Government but to the External Affairs Ministry — relied disproportionately on the vocabulary 
and practice of welfare and development for state-making throughout the 1950s. Combining a 
mixture of development and welfare schemes together with measures to protect and revive 'tribal' 
culture and lifestyles, the 'NEFA philosophy' (Elwin 1957) that they put forward was supposed 
not only to embed the state on the frontier, but also to 'inspire [frontier communities] with 
confidence and to make them feel at one with India, and to realise that they are part of India and 
have an honoured place in it' (Nehru 1985, 151).2 In reality, tribal development did little for 
NEFA's integration into the Indian nation; in fact state-building processes resulted in the 
disintegration of the links that had tied NEFA with its regional hinterland in India. In the process, 
some of the seeds of tensions plaguing today's Northeast India were planted. 
 
A privileged tool for state-making: Tribal development 
 
Though nominally part of India since the Simla Convention of 1914 that had delimited the 
border between India and Tibet, NEFA was in practice little administered in 1947. Entire areas 
remained unexplored, and what few administrative and semi-military outposts existed lay in the 
foothills. The majority of the population, who belonged to several dozen different tribal 
communities of Tibetan and Southeast Asian stock, had never encountered agents of the Indian 
state. Indeed, in the northern reaches of the area the economic, political, and cultural influence 
was that of Tibet. Colonial regulations had instituted an Inner Line between NEFA and Assam, 
prohibiting the entry of outsiders into the latter – except for state officials – and limiting state 
expansion. NEFA was thus 'a territorial exterior of the theatre of capital […and] a temporal 
outside of the historical pace of development and progress' (Kar 2009, 49-77, 51-52). Its special, 
un-administered status was further enshrined by the fact that, though constitutionally part of 
Assam, the borderland was administered by a frontier administration answering to the Central 
Ministry of External Affairs. Thus at the time of the transfer of power, everything remained to be 
done in terms of state-making and nation-building. 
                                                     
2 The letter is dated 29 October 1952. 
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The Nehruvian era saw the genesis of the deployment of the Indian state’s administrative and 
developmentalist apparatus and of a tribal-specific policy. State expansion in NEFA began in 
earnest in late 1950, after the promulgation of the Sixth Schedule and in the wake of a 
humanitarian catastrophe (the Assam earthquake, which for the first time caused the 
administration to undertake relief and rehabilitation efforts towards frontier tribes) and a geo-
political crisis (the Chinese invasion of nearby Tibet) (Guyot-Réchard, forthcoming, chapter 2). 
Early 1951 witnessed the beginnings of a comprehensive push inland, aimed not just at 
strengthening control over strategic valleys but at expanding Indian authority on previously 
neglected areas. Exploration and consolidation were to eliminate the existence of unexplored 
areas as quickly as possible, particularly near the Tibetan border, and to open up border outposts 
at all the strategic points.3 In 1954, the promulgation of the North East Frontier Areas 
(Administration) Regulation consecrated administrative expansion and reorganised the Agency 
into six Frontier Divisions (Luthra 1971). 
Beneath this apparent normalisation, however, NEFA authorities faced huge limitations on their 
law- and border-enforcement capabilities. First of all, they were confronted to an extremely 
mountainous, jungle-clad terrain — the same terrain that had represented such a big challenge to 
pre-colonial state-like polities attempting to conquer the Himalayan or Southeast Asian 
highlands (Scott 2009) — whose penetration was rendered even more difficult by a nine-month-
                                                     
3. For a list of the number of outposts by the late 1950s, see Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, 
NEFA Secretariat (1958), List of administrative centres in NEFA, P66/58. 
 4 
 
long monsoon. In addition, they also experienced pervasive manpower, financial, and material 
constraints. Personnel shortages that had plagued the administration even in the colonial period 
worsened as a consequence of Partition, for instance.4 While the administrative and technical 
situation improved from the mid-1950s onwards thanks to the creation of frontier-specific 
administrative and engineering cadres, shortages conversely worsened in the semi-military 
Assam Rifles forces, who were being diverted to the Naga hills to curb the mounting 
independence movement there.5 Moreover, the build-up of transport and communications 
infrastructure remained alarmingly slow throughout the 1950s. Even in 1960, this expansion of 
administration 'always in advance of its real resources in men and material’ meant that the 
international border remained highly porous and several patches of unexplored areas still existed, 
and that due to the absence of road and wireless communication the whole administration could 
easily break down.6 
 
Under these circumstances, the possibility and sustainability of state penetration hinged on the 
capacity of frontier authorities to express their authority and reach in (outwardly) benevolent 
terms, those of state-led development and cultural protection. This had been grasped by the last 
colonial officials, who asserted that ‘any form of development is a political and strategic 
necessity’, for ‘a contented loyal population is […] of the highest importance’.7 Obtaining tribal 
goodwill by undertaking welfare and development activities acquired an ever greater resonance 
once a resurgent China appeared on the other side of the border. Convinced that the Himalayas 
were a reliable physical barrier against invasion and hence that militarising NEFA was not a 
priority, however, Indian authorities were much more worried about the pull effect of Chinese 
presence on frontier populations: concerns thus lay in convincing the latter not to look towards 
China ('The Himalayan frontier I’, Times of India, 22 November 1950).8 Parallel to 
administrative expansion, therefore, the 1950s saw the introduction of a flurry of development 
and welfare schemes on the frontier, from the introduction of wet-rice cultivation and husbandry 
to the opening of schools, dispensaries, and hospitals, or the founding of crafts training and 
production centres. 
Welfare schemes and activities enabled the entrenchment of the Indian state on the frontier in a 
way that had hitherto eluded it. This was, to begin with, because their implementation led to the 
systematisation of a mundane practice essential to the iteration of the state’s vertical properties: 
inspections (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 987). While administrative touring was a fundamental 
component of the relationship between tribal populations and the state, officers and subordinate 
                                                     
4. New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1956), Consolidation of NEFA administration upto the 
border, 7(31)-NEFA/56.; New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1947), Appointment of Captain 
Campbell, Major Kathing and Captain Sailo for work in the Assam Tribal Areas, 80-NEF/47;New Delhi, 
NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1947), Arrangement for the staffing of the agencies in the North-East 
Frontier, 51-NEF/47. 
5.  NAI, External 7(31)-NEFA/56. Points for Adviser’s discussion regarding the expansion programme in 
New Delhi. 
6. Ibid. 
7. London, British Library, Miscellaneous papers relating to the North-East Frontier of India (1945), 
'Blueprint for Sadiya: A post-war reconstruction plan for Sadiya Frontier Tract', by G. E. D. Walker 
London, D1191/11. 
8. This view would prevail up to 1962, when the ex-Adviser to the Governor G.E.D. Walker expressed 
his doubts that the Chinese would ever be able to go down the Lohit Valley as a result of the earthquake. 
'Assam Rifles post at Walong was set up in 1944', Assam Tribune, 15 November 1962. 
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staff remained few in numbers. By contrast, the creation of various development branches 
quickly led to the recruitment of medical, agricultural, or crafts inspectors and sub-inspectors. 
Not only did this sheer multiplication in the number of touring officials increase the frequency to 
which tribal communities encountered the state; but because such inspectors were locally based, 
they could also cover the surrounding areas more intensely. Moreover, every single touring 
officer, regardless of rank or capacity, was required to report and give his opinion on both their 
sphere of interest and the rest.9 The encounter with a low-rank inspector one week, the Chief 
Medical Officer the other, and perhaps the Governor at some point, constructed a perception of 
the state as a complex, top-down hierarchy. Whereas the lonely Political Officer on tour in the 
1940s had presented a very flat vision of it, the NEFA administration was now gradually 
acquiring the ‘topography of stacked, vertical levels’ integral to perceptions of the modern state 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 983). 
State-making also informed the very fabric of development structures on the frontier, which 
increasingly centred around Community Projects and National Extension Schemes, i.e., 
development 'blocks' that involved selecting a specific tribal area for concentrated, all-round 
development: agriculture; healthcare; education; sanitation; cottage industries. This 
concentration of all development activities into one overall scheme proceeded from two 
rationales. First the Indian state hoped to make a concentrated demonstration of everything it 
could do (that is, could provide) for the population; second, it aimed to anchor its presence in 
both the everyday, the mundane, and in the exceptional. 
The latter aspect was performed in elaborate, carefully planned out inauguration ceremonies. In 
1953 for instance, a one-day long programme of festivities was planned, after much 
administrative brainstorming, for the brand new Namsang block. It included a guard of honour; 
collaborative fieldwork, including tree planting and village clearing; as well as collective feasts, 
tribal dances, and a cinema show. Together, these different activities at once embodied the 
authority of the state, the new order to come (through a revamped village), the links between 
frontier administration and society (through a common meal), the promise of development 
(fieldwork was inaugurated by the governor himself and there was a small-scale exhibit on 
education, agriculture, and health), and the celebration of tribal culture.10 The elaborate rituals 
associated with their opening were thus a performance the ‘vertical’ properties of the state, 
symbolised in particular through the governor or the adviser descending among the tribes to 
assert the benevolent presence of the state. 
 
This state-making process hinged on a crucial variable: the attitude and actions of frontier 
populations themselves. Critics of post-colonial governmentality too readily assume that 
development is a purely top-down process, in which populations constitute mere 'targets' of 
government schemes (Chatterjee 2004, 34-37). A critical analysis of the developmental state 
does not need, however, to see the latter as single-handedly imposing its logic of welfare. Indeed, 
in the case of NEFA frontier administration focused on developmentalism not merely (nor even 
primarily) because of the Nehru-Elwin philosophy, but because its limitations had long taught it 
                                                     
9. The main sources for this are the countless tour diaries written by frontier officers. Some of them are 
more informative than others, for instance Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat 
(1958), Tour diary of LRN Srivastava, ARO Siang, R-58/58. 
10. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1953), Inauguration of 2nd 
Community Development Block at Namsang, CP-132/53. 
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that it could not work without tribal communities and because these populations themselves were 
often demanding welfare measures.  
The weakness of the late colonial and early post-colonial frontier state gave tribals a lot of 
latitude to ‘work’ the state. Even by pan-Indian standards, its knowledge-gathering and 
organisational capabilities were highly deficient.11 In particular, nowhere were officers so few or 
entrusted with such large areas and, as a result, they disproportionately relied on a group of 
native actors: Political Interpreters and Tibetan Agents. Their linguistic mastery and ties to the 
local community were crucial in collecting indigenous information and smoothening out state 
expansion, from settling the pay of porters to negotiating entry into local villages and 
communicating about official policy.12 Council elders, gaonburas, slaves, and traders were also 
solicited to tap into native information networks and administer justice. As the developmental 
state gathered pace some of these strongmen, and especially the new generation of educated 
tribals, were inducted into the lower levels of administration by being hired as village workers 
(Mize 2001, 21, 25). 
Here was therefore a space for significant local agency. Evidently, the various frontier 
populations did not see the arrival of the state as a wonderful event, and communities dealt with 
both administrative expansion and developmental schemes in very varied ways. Some 
communities could adopt ‘conspiracies of silence’ towards a new administrative presence, 
'profess[ing] ignorance' and being 'purposely evasive'.13 Others, conversely (and sometimes from 
the same tribe), were unexpectedly welcoming. Some and even demanded a new outpost.14 
Schemes or policies well accepted in one community or village could be resisted or evaded in 
others; and different groups and individuals could adopt contrasting attitudes. These varied 
reactions were often due to dynamics internal to their social, economic, and cultural 
environment. The Apa Tanis, for instance, had welcomed the establishment of administration in 
the hope that it would settle their feuds against neighbouring Dafla communities in their 
favour.15  
Inequalities in this regard were both changeable and multi-faceted, but they were above all 
individual, spatial, and generational. Individuals who met frontier officials early on were more 
likely to become interpreters or contractors. Similarly, communities that came in contact with 
state structures first had a powerful advantage over those that came later, resulting in a 
disproportionate leverage of communities situated closer to the foothills or to administrative 
headquarters. And gradually, a small cohort of young, educated tribals emerged from the first 
schools established on the frontier. Inducted into the lower ranks of administration as village 
workers, they soon began to compete with the older generation of headmen for local influence. 
Once administrative expansion began gathering pace, however, these dynamics were re-
articulated under — and around — state presence: the potential for agency gradually shifted to 
those with prior and better access to the government structures. Frontier developmentalism 
reinforced this dynamic by raising the stakes of prior or better access to access government jobs, 
                                                     
11. For an analysis of the colonial ‘information order’ in India, see C. A. Bayly (1996). 
12. See for instance Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1954), Tour diary of Assistant 
Tibetan Agent Mechukha; APSA, P-82/55. 
13. New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1945), Tour diaries of Capt Davy in the Dafla hills, 
241-CA/45., 13 March 1945 
14. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1952), Tour diary of PO Sela, P-
29/52, pp.6-7. 
15. BL, IOR/L/PS/12/3120. Report on Tour to Eastern Daflas and Apa Tani, Nov-Dec 1945, p.8. 
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schemes, and resources at both individual and collective levels. Development blocks, in 
particular, created a spatial boundary between those populations covered by them and those 
which were not. Whereas earlier on, 'access' had meant influencing a touring official to settle an 
inter-tribal feud in one’s favour, it now meant convincing the administration to implement a 
welfare scheme in one’s own community rather than elsewhere; being chosen as a contractor for 
a big bridge-building scheme; receiving a variety of political gifts; or being sent on an all-
expenses paid trip to Delhi. 
Increasingly therefore, communities and individuals alike used the administration's need for their 
cooperation on infrastructure and other work to make various demands on the state. In some 
cases, it was for the recognition of local institutions. More often, however, it was to obtain 
welfare and infrastructure facilities. In one locality, a touring officer might face demands for 
wire ropes to bridge the river. In another, villagers might ask questions regarding agricultural 
methods that went far beyond official objectives, causing the administration to launch a 
programme of research and trial to support 'more intelligent and progressive farmers'.16 The 
biggest demands (and complaints), however, concerned the availability of educational, and 
healthcare infrastructure (Verghese, 'The Last Frontier IV’, Times of India, 4 February 1956).  
Tribal communities were self-aware about these new dynamics. Competition for schemes 
became fierce, and the communities with the longest and strongest history of contact with 
government schemes and officials were also the most vocal in their dealings with frontier 
administration. In 1961, the Minyong council thus demanded that the Pangin administrative 
centre — located among the Padam tribe — be immediately shifted to Boleng, on their territory. 
To give added weight to the demand, all the Minyongs in Boleng constructed a helipad of their 
own initiative (Mibang 2001, 26-29). Individuals or communities that felt disadvantaged in the 
process had their own way of responding: arriving in a new community as a village worker, a 
young tribal thus the gaonbura had built his living quarters two miles from the village and 
refused to move them (Mize 2001, 21-25). The boundary was now between those who had ties to 
states, and those that did not (or not to the same extent).  
 
Nation-building: Lost in translation? 
 
Did this emerging reality of ‘India’ as a state necessarily translate into ‘India’ as a nation? Under 
the official discourse of the NEFA administration, the answer was yes. Elwin's Philosophy for 
NEFA envisioned state-making as automatically leading to the emergence of a national 
sentiment: 'we hope to see as the result of our efforts a spirit of love and loyalty for India, 
without a trace of suspicion that Government has come into the tribal areas to colonise or exploit, 
a full integration of mind and heart with the great society of which the tribal people form a part 
[…]' (Elwin 1957, 9). Theoretically, therefore, state- and nation-building were conflated. Yet, on 
the ground, there was a significant gap between the two. 
The first gap between nation- and state-building proceeded precisely from the fact that Indian 
authorities presumed them to be inherently linked: since it would naturally flow from economic 
betterment and a revivified tribal culture, how to bring about nation-building did not need 
theorisation or systematic planning. In contrast to the long discussions on fine-tuning 
development schemes, the ways to improve the acceptability and permanence of administrative 
presence, and strategies to preserve and celebrate ‘tribalness’, government archives show a great 
                                                     
16. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1952), Tour notes of Agricultural 
Officer, Jan 1952, Agri-7/52, 16. 
 8 
 
paucity of strategic reflections on 'selling NEFA to India and India to NEFA'.17 Even when 
Elwin outlined the 'psychological aims' of the NEFA philosophy, it was by framing them in the 
negative terms of preventing the birth of an inferiority complex among frontier populations 
(Elwin 1957, 51-77).  No strategy or substantial concrete steps for the development of positive, 
substantive interaction between NEFA's inhabitants and people from the rest of India were made. 
This lack of prioritisation was reflected in the secondary, adjunct role played by the Publicity 
Branch of the NEFA Research Department and Elwin's great reluctance towards 'Delhi's plans' 
for publicising India to frontier populations and vice-versa.18 
The practical aspects of nation-building were therefore under-theorised, and initiatives in this 
direction were highly fragmented. Administrative and development staff touring the countryside 
screened documentaries with the assistance of mobile cinema units and magic lanterns during 
their tours,19 but what particular message was delivered by these shows remains unclear. Many 
reels apparently served to highlight progress across the frontier and rewards associated with 
them, but none of them overtly focussed on any common path its inhabitants might share with 
India at large. Development was not necessarily characterised as an Indian effort — wet-rice 
cultivation was promoted as a Japanese technique — and movies screenings were a thematic 
hodgepodge ranging from Manipuri drums and Gandhi's life to animal fights and the African 
wilderness.20  
Thematic confusion aside, the 'authorial voice' of the state, working towards nation-building, that 
some scholars see expressed in such movies (Roy 2007) was in fact far from unmediated.  
Documentaries were not shown in brute form but accompanied by the commentary of 
interpreters who — since they were deeply inserted in local relations and structures of power — 
likely represented competing or at least subversive authorial voices. In any case, these 
interpreters’ own capacity to translate was mitigated by the huge linguistic variety encountered 
in NEFA. Yet frontier administration remained strangely oblivious of the substantive role of 
tribal interpreters in conveying a message, and bypassed the question of the transferability of 
notions such as 'nation' into different tribal world-views and the audience's own interpretations. 
 
As a result, contrary to state-making, nation-building was peripheral and contingent rather than 
central to frontier policy. The first sign of this imbalance was that, in contrast to the 
embeddedness of state-making practices in both the everyday and special occasions, the nation 
was iterated not as a part of daily life, but as part of the exceptional.  
While nations are constructed through images of communion between members that do not know 
each other personally, the tools conducive to a simultaneous, homogeneous time — the printed 
press and a literate population (Anderson 1991, 6, 37) — were absent on Assam's north-east 
frontier. Even more than elsewhere in India, therefore, performing the nation rested above all on 
the twin practices of celebrating Republic Day and Independence Day in the Frontier Divisions 
and of inviting tribal guests to attend and perform during the big parades in Delhi.21 These 
initiatives served several, interlinked purposes. First, they helped reinforce the state's vital 
                                                     
17. New Delhi, NMML, Elwin Papers (1961), Differing views on publicity set up in NEFA, 1954-61, 
S.No.128, 2. 
18.  NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.128. 
19. Ibid 2-3. 
20. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1953), Tour diary of Publicity 
Inspector, ACT-18/53. 
21. On the nation-building functions of these parades, see Roy (2007). 
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relationship with tribal elites. Attendees were local leaders and strongmen, such as the Rani of 
the Akas or lamas from the Tawang monastery.22 Second, their witnessing the parade in Delhi on 
the same day that tribals celebrated in their own way helped, later on, to highlight the 
'simultaneous time' inhabited by NEFA and the rest of India (Nehru 1985, 225).23  Upon their 
return to NEFA, these guests were each given a set of photographs of the celebrations to treasure 
and show to the rest of their community.24 Yet for all the merriment they entailed, these public 
celebrations still belonged to the realm of the exceptional. They took place on two days of the 
year only, and the potential for a tribal to attend one of them was dependent on his or her being 
relatively close to an administrative centre of development block.  
The same exceptionality can be discerned in carefully planned visits by 'V.I.P.s' such as 
successive Assam governors or key central officials. These V.I.P.s were more likely to mention 
'India' than touring frontier officers, who primarily focused on developmentand 'tribalness'. They 
also drew huge numbers of frontier inhabitants to them (how these visits were announced is 
nowhere mentioned). Nehru for instance addressed some 10,000 people in the Balipara foothills 
in 1952, and seized the opportunity to emphasise India's friendliness towards its neighbours and 
the responsibility of frontier populations to keep it safe. To another community, he also 
emphasised that 'they belonged to a very big country the name of which was Hindustan or 
Bharat. This vast country was inhabited by millions of people and it was his desire as the Prime 
Minister to see all of them live happily and do their own part’ ('Nehru assures help to all frontier 
tribals', The Assam Tribune, 23 October 1952). 
Here again, however, these visits were circumscribed in time, and limited to a few well 
administered areas — mainly the headquarters and the foothills — of a territory that is nearly as 
big as that of West Bengal. Moreover while each these visits indeed seemed to have gone well, 
tribal attendance may also have been motivated by the need to evaluate this new phenomenon of 
state presence. To NEFA's inhabitants, belonging to an Indian nation might therefore have been a 
feeling experienced temporarily, on set and clearly defined dates, receding afterwards and 
remaining forgotten until the next big event. 
 
If nation-building was contingent, it also obeyed an overarching rationale of the Nehru-Elwin 
policy: the state as mediator and superior to the nation. Even in the bounded time-space where 
tribal belonging to a wider Indian 'brotherhood' was emphasised, such as in public celebrations, 
this brotherhood was itself delimited in very specific ways. See the Governor's speech 
inaugurating the Namsang development block in 1953: 
 
[F]rom now onwards you must all consider yourselves as brothers, live in peace and so help 
each other for you good. [...] We who have come from outside to this village, some from 
the plains, from Gauhati, Dibrugarh, Delhi, Calcutta, we all are just like your brothers. 
Other people elsewhere are also your brothers. We are all one. This you should understand 
[…] A few years ago English Kings used to rule this country. But their rule is over. We told 
them that we people, all of us, would govern our own country. We shall work for our own 
                                                     
22. Guwahati, Assam State Archives, Tribal Areas Department (1952), Republic Day celebrations 1953, 
TAD/ Con/119/52. Daulatram to Medhi, 6 January 1953; Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, 
NEFA Secretariat (1960), Tribal invitees from NEFA to witness the Republic Day Celebrations 1961 
P57/60.  
23 Letter dated 27 January 1953. 
24. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, NEFA Secretariat (1956), Distribution of photos on 
Republic Day celebration in New Delhi by NEFA in 1956 R-40/56. 
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people. We want our people to be prosperous and rich. […] At present people think that 
you are very backward. Goodness or badness does not depend upon how many clothes you 
wear. […] But people of other places think you are backward. We want that you should be 
able to dress yourselves better. You may not copy other forms of dress. […] We want also 
that your houses should be clean. […] Human beings like you have manufactured motor 
cars, aeroplanes, watches. So also we want you and your children should be as clever as 
anybody else in the world. We want your children to be educated in the school and later on 
in a big school which is called college. One day one of your children will become the 
Political Officer of your district. You may not today believe it. But I tell you that your 
children are born clever and if they study properly, they will rise and occupy high positions 
and one of you can even become a Governor. You are as good as anybody else. […] One 
day you will find that my words will come true.25 
 
Here, tribal communities were reminded of the existence of a world beyond NEFA (people 
coming from the plains, as far as Delhi); the anti-colonial struggle was evoked as a common 
fight; and images of general prosperity for people within and beyond the frontier were 
summoned. Yet at the same time, the speech shied away from explicitly mentioning India: the 
word does not once appear in the speech and other inhabitants within the nation's boundaries 
were only alluded to as ‘people’. Moreover, rather than being on the sharing of trials and hopes 
between equals, the focus was on tribal communities striving to reach up to the level of the rest 
of the ‘people’. Rather than a pre-existing common destiny, what NEFA's inhabitants could hope 
for was coming to the level of others. While present, India-as-nation therefore quickly drowned. 
 
There was a towering presence in the speech, however — that of the Indian state. The ‘we who 
have come from outside […] just like your brothers’ referred to the administration’s officials, not 
to private citizens. And the goal, the ultimate proof, of having ‘caught up’ lay in securing a 
government position, rather than in the assumption of political rights. The ideal to achieve was 
not that of a citizen of India; but of a (frontier) bureaucrat. 
In other words, the Nehru-Elwin philosophy relied — both in its implementation and underlying 
rationale — on the construction of the state's idea and apparatus as the go-between between 
tribals and the nation at large. This construction worked in both directions (whether in bringing 
awareness of India to NEFA or publicising NEFA to the rest of India) and expressed itself 
primarily in two ways: limiting physical interaction between frontier inhabitants and other Indian 
citizens; and controlling the flow of information to and from the frontier. 
This was not the only way in which the state acted as a filter between NEFA and the rest of 
India. Simultaneously, NEFA authorities made decided attempts to reshape the politics of tribal 
belonging around the Indian state, narrowly embodied in frontier administration. From the mid-
1950s onwards, creating feelings of belonging between the local population and the 
administration became an overarching policy imperative on a par with other aspects of the NEFA 
philosophy. The administration was urged to adopt a 'missionary' outlook, and to act as a 'family' 
both within its ranks and in forging ties with local populations, ensuring that 'the tribes regard 
themselves as one with ourselves'.26 'We are to guide our children', Elwin wrote in November 
1955.27 Running through much of the official record on NEFA for the period, this 'family 
                                                     
25.  APSA, CP-132/53 27-30. 
26. Delhi, NMML, Rustomji Papers (1963), Broadcasts, tour notes, articles etc (1959-63), S.No.8., p.11 
27. Delhi, NMML, Elwin Papers (1957), Report by Verrier Elwin on tours 1954-57, S.No.138., Teju to 
Roing, November 1955, p.44 
 11 
 
rhetoric' aimed to upgrade the relationship between the administration and the tribes into a sort of 
emotional symbiosis.28  
To do this, frontier staff first had to firmly anchor themselves among tribal communities. This 
was a challenge, for staff turn-over was high. Few officers remained in their post for long. From 
the late 1950s onwards, the administration sought to curb the number of transfers out of NEFA 
by scrutinising and discouraging every one of them: constant reshuffling was harmful not just for 
development work but also for 'psychological integration'.29 In parallel, the earlier preference for 
bachelors as frontier officers gave way to an active policy of recruiting married couples. In 
several cases husband and wife were each hired in their individual capacity,30 but more generally 
the latter played an unofficial role. Officers' wives not only constituted a useful manpower 
reserve, but their presence also enabled the forging of 'soft', more spontaneous relations with the 
tribes, less bound by the paraphernalia of authority (Krishnatry 2005).  
Yet the elaboration of new forms of belonging embedding the frontier state with local 
populations lay, above all, in the former adopting external signs of 'tribalness'.31 While local 
authorities attempted to assert their spatial authority over tribal communities through 
developmentalism, they simultaneously needed to externally blur the boundary between state and 
society by presenting the former as externally akin to, and understanding of, the latter. In other 
words, the NEFA administration had to 'look tribal' in order for the population to identify with it, 
even as in practice, this population's prospects within its higher reaches were few. This was a 
subtle equilibrium to find. 
Elwin attempted to find it by outwardly 'tribalising' both the state's agents and its buildings. 
Whether in the Education Department or in other administrative divisions, learning local 
languages was a key duty of frontier staff.32 Staff were also strongly encouraged to wear tribal 
dress. Senior frontier officials tried to show the lead in these matters.33 Finally, touring officials 
were encouraged to drink rice-beer with the population and to partake in tribal feasts and 
ceremonies as much as possible — so long as they were welcomed to do so — and common 
activities were favoured, such as football matches between local youth and Assam Rifles. The 
many pictures of these activities taken by the NEFA Publicity Branch testify to the importance 
attached to the forging of such informal links; some of them, in fact, might have been enlarged 
and displayed in administrative centres to further highlight this new dynamic.34 
 
                                                     
28. For example New Delhi, NMML, Elwin Papers (1955), Change of designation of political officers, 
S.No.119., Mehta to Kaul, 12 December 1955 
29. Delhi, NMML, Elwin Papers (1957), Correspondence with Ministry of External Affairs about 
Research Fellowships, 1956-57, S.No.5., Note on the various points raised by the Ministry 
30.  NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.119., Mehta to Kaul, 12 December 1955 
31. A similar idea had animated colonial officials on the North-West Frontier under the ‘Sandeman 
system’ (Marsden and Hopkins 2011, chapter 2). 
32. New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1956), Dr Elwin's notes on his visit to Bomdila and 
Tawang, 4(5)-NEFA/56; NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.5. 
33.  NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.5.Note on the various points raised by the Ministry. 
34. See the photographic collections of the Arunachal Pradesh IPR Department, particularly for 1958 and 
1959. 
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Nari Rustomji, Advisor to the Governor of Assam, dancing with Adi (Abor) warriors at Along, 
Siang Division, 1959 
Courtesy: Arunachal Pradesh Information and Public Relations Department 
 
In and of themselves, these tensions between state-making and nation-building could just have 
represented the difficulties inherent in an early stage of nation-building. What turned them into 
antithetical projects was the fact that, instead of fostering NEFA's integration with its Indian 
hinterland, the NEFA philosophy led to the hardening of cultural, economic, and political 
differences between the hills of NEFA and the plains of Assam, undermining nation-building and 
planting the seed for future conflicts. 
By its very nature, the policy of central authorities in charge of NEFA gradually eroded the 
interaction and miscegenation between NEFA and neighbouring parts of Assam. In spite of the 
Inner Line, frontier populations had historically been a nodal point between the Indian, Sino-
Tibetan, and Burmese worlds. Economic, cultural, and population flux permeated India's north-
eastern borderlands from all directions, and ties with Assam were of all sorts, particularly for 
communities living close to it. The Noctes of Tirap had adopted Vaishnavism,35 the Sherdukpens 
of Kameng migrated to the plains during winter, and some Daflas had established themselves 
there permanently.36 There was also significant economic inter-dependence – the Sherdukpens, 
for instance, largely depended on plains rice, which they generally obtained in exchange for 
                                                     
35. Elwin 9, 153 Note, Elwin (pp.40-48) [post-1962] 
36. London, SOAS, Fürer-Haimendorf Papers (1945), Diary of Fürer-Haimendorf's first tour to the Apa 
Tani Valley, 1944-45, PP MS 19, Box 3. 
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radish and chilly37 – as well important elements of cultural miscegenation. The lower Abor had 
long imbued Assamese merchandise and ideas, and their sister tribe, the Miris (Mishings), had 
long established themselves in the plains (Nyori 1993, 195; Borang 2001, 14-18).  
 
These linkages gradually eroded over the course of the 1950s, first of all as a consequence of the 
tenets of the NEFA philosophy. First, the full economic and food self-sufficiency of frontier 
populations, which was a core aspect of state developmentalism, entailed reducing inter-
dependence with Assam.38 Second, the preservation of tribal pride, culture, and traditions 
translated, under Elwin's leadership, into an active process of (re-)creation of 'tribalness'. 
Envisioned (and promoted) by frontier administration, the process was characterised as 
‘introducing certain good things,’ from dances and songs to new crafts and to the standardisation 
and promotion of festivals – so long as they were deemed appropriately tribal.39 
These visions of tribalness were not all inclusive; indeed, they were highly selective. In 
particular, they actively reified the boundary between the 'tribal' and the 'non-tribal'. Assamese-
influenced dress was deemed inappropriate;40 tribes that seasonally moved to the plains were 
discouraged to do so,41 and existing trade routes between the hills and the plains progressively 
died out, for example the cattle trade of the Apa Tani tribe.42 Festivals and exhibitions that 
occasionally gathered people from the hills and the lowlands together also died out after the mid-
1950s.43  
Not all these changes resulted from a deliberate desire to insulate the uplands’ cultural and 
economic world; nor were all these policies successful. But, in any event, the increasing cultural 
and economic distance that came as a by-product of the NEFA philosophy contributed to 
insulating the 'real' tribals of the ‘highlands’ from the rest of Assam’s own very mixed 
population, including tribal communities living in the plains.  
The hills/plains and tribal/non-tribal divide also crystallised in the Nehruvian era as a result of 
increasing conflicts between Delhi and successive Assam ministries. These tensions proceeded, 
in no small extent, from the confrontation of central designs for state-building and the Assam 
government's own region-building plans. Following the transfer of Bengali-speaking Sylhet to 
East Pakistan in 1947, the Assamese had achieved a position of demographic dominance in the 
state and their politicians actively sought to culturally re-organise north-eastern India around 
Assam (Bhaumik 1998, 310-327). The provincial leadership had initially accepted the 
constitutional decision to retain NEFA under central administration for the time being, on 
account of its 'backward' and weakly administered condition. Yet it argued that the Constitution 
made NEFA's 'progressive assimilation' into Assam the ineluctable, 'ultimate goal' of frontier 
                                                     
37. Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives (1945), Tour Diary of 
PO Balipara, Feb 1944 - Nov 1945. 
38. This meant first and foremost self-sufficiency in food production, but also extended to artefacts, dress, 
and material things in general. 
39. NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.149. 
40. Delhi, NMML, Elwin Papers (1956), Comments on ATA’s reports, 1954-59, S.No.133., Rustomji 
Note, 19 April 1956. 
41. Elwin's notes on his visit to Bomdila and Tawang  Dr Elwin's notes on his visit to Bomdila and 
Tawang, 4(5)-NEFA/56). 
42. London, SOAS, Fürer-Haimendorf Papers (1945), Diary of Fürer-Haimendorf's first tour to the Apa 
Tani Valley, 1944-45, PP MS 19, Box 3. 
43. The last one took place in 1954. 'Hills and plains festival: Artistes and athletes to join in large 
numbers', The Assam Tribune (11 December 1953); and NMML, Elwin Papers S.No.149. 
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policy, and that consequently the duty of (interim) central administration was to prepare it for 
this as quickly as possible.44 Assam authorities therefore sought to retain an active involvement 
in NEFA — insisting on being consulted by frontier administration45 or participating in relief and 
rehabilitation efforts after the 1950 earthquake46 — and used Republic Day thematic shows in 
Delhi to re-affirm that NEFA was part of Assam.47 
Significantly, Assam officials — from Gopinath Bardoloi and Bishnuram Medhi, the first two 
Chief Ministers, to MLAs like Hem Barua — harnessed a vocabulary that drew on a pan-Indian 
nation-building rhetoric of 'unity in diversity’ (Roy 2007). Claims for greater regional integration 
were articulated around the twin images of 'India's sentinel' and 'Assam as a miniature India'.48 
The first image implied that to save itself, India had to save Assam; the second that the Centre 
could not possibly dismantle Assam without simultaneously undermining the very rationale for 
Indian unity.49 
An increasing tug-of-war ensued between State government and central/frontier administration, 
which the former eventually lost. In contrast to the general disinterest of pan-Indian politicians 
and public opinion for NEFA, Assam policy-makers and newspapers consistently criticised 
frontier policy throughout the 1950s. The administration's ‘iron curtain’ was vilified, and above 
all, the decision to privilege Hindi as the second language of the tribes was made the object of a 
particularly strong campaign. For the provincial Congress Committee, 'the relation of Assam and 
the North-East Frontier Areas. […was] natural and inseparable from the point of history and 
geography', yet 'the working of the administration [was] not conducive towards realisation of the 
underlying policy and object as contemplated in the constitution.'50  
For their part, central and frontier authorities were increasingly critical of Assam, and therefore 
ill-disposed towards fostering or retaining links with it. For instance, Nehru was highly critical of 
the way state authorities had handled the 1950 earthquake crisis. This propagated the idea that 
Assam was incapable (financially or otherwise) of taking care of itself and its tribal inhabitants. 
Medhi's authoritarian attitude towards the tribal Autonomous Districts of Assam, his frequent 
talk of 'assimilation',51 as well as the increasing political mobilisation of north-eastern tribes and 
the degeneration of the Naga conflict, further played against Assam. The result was the 
progressive administrative separation of NEFA from Assam, long before the area became the 
Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh in 1972. From 1953 onwards, the foundation of a separate 
                                                     
44. New Delhi, NMML, B.N. Medhi Papers (1952-53), Correspondence with Nehru regarding the 
administration of NEF areas, Subject File No.2., Medhi to Nehru, 6 June 1952. 
45. Ibid. 
46. See editions of the Amrita Bazaar Patrika for August 1950. 
47.  ASA, TAD/ Con/119/524. 
48. These rhetoric were initially deployed in Constituent Assembly Debates, especially Constituent 
Assembly, Constituent Assembly Debates (Proceedings) IX,(1946-1950), 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/debates.htm [accessed 5 October 2009]. The “miniature India” 
argument was especially put forward by the Assam Sahitya Sabha association. See The outlook on NEFA, 
ed. by Assam Sahitya Sabha (Calcutta: Nabajiban Press, 1958). 
49. ‘The general population of Assam consists of tribals and non-tribals. By keeping a considerable 
number of tribals separate from another considerable no of them as also from the non-tribals of Assam, 
how can the Centre hope to create a united Indian nation? Indian unity lies among others through the 
integrity of a frontier state like Assam.’  NMML, Medhi Papers, S.F. No.2., Medhi to Nehru, 14 May 
1953. 
50. New Delhi, NMML, APCC Papers (1955), APCC Proceedings, 1937-55, Reel 3599. 
51.  NMML, Medhi Papers, S.F. No.2. 
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frontier cadre were laid52 — officially created in 1956 as the Indian Frontier Administrative 
Service (IFAS)53 — and communications between frontier authorities and the State Government 
gradually died out.54 By 1959, External Affairs discussed changing the title of NEFA's top 
official (the Advisor to the Governor) to ‘Chief Commissioner’, and transforming NEFA itself 
into a 'North-East Frontier Territory' to mark central jurisdiction.55 
The tribal inhabitants of the foothills between NEFA and Assam populations were the most 
affected by this increasing distantiation. Various communities protested against this dynamic, 
which impeded on their freedom of movement and went against their economic inter-dependence 
and cultural ties.56 The Miris from Upper Assam, in particular, contended that they were the 
sister tribe of the Abors of central NEFA, with common ancestors, customs, and manners; they 
stressed that they originally all came from the hills, and that some of them indeed still remained 
there, just as some Abors sometimes migrated to the plains. From their perspective, the hills-
plains divide did not and should not exist.57 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Over the 1950s and early 1960s, the Indian state gradually expanded into its remote and hitherto 
largely forgotten eastern Himalayan borderland. Tribal developmentalism was the most 
important tool in this evolution, not least because, in a context where the state was defined by 
vulnerability, NEFA's inhabitants found in it a way to negotiate their acquiescence to its presence 
in exchange for tangible goods and benefits. While this expansion did not go without hurdles — 
indeed, it was a protracted, uneven, and non-linear process, which tribal agency could constrain 
or conversely enable — it would eventually succeed in making the Indian state something of a 
reality, a tangible presence on the frontier.  
Yet this state-making process was not accompanied by a parallel process of 'becoming Indian' 
(Alam 2008). Rhetorically, the representatives of the Indian state claimed to be working towards 
the region's integration into an Indian nation. But on the ground, awareness of India as a nation 
was restricted to a limited time-space, and official initiatives to shape new forms of belonging 
were narrowly articulated around frontier state authorities themselves. In fact, in many ways 
state-making undermined the possibilities for nation-building in NEFA. By limiting interaction 
and movement between the frontier and the rest of India and attempting to revive a supposedly 
authentic 'tribalness' — purified of any 'non-tribal' content, especially Assamese — NEFA 
authorities unravelled the dynamic, hybrid political economy that had linked frontier inhabitants 
to the Brahmaputra valley, and sealed them away from the national mainstream. The increasingly 
confrontational relationship between Delhi and the Assam government only accelerated this 
                                                     
52. New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1953), Notes by T.N. Kaul, N/53/1395/105. 
53. New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1956), Election of NEFA officers and their 
appointment to the Indian Frontier Administrative Service, 18(5)-NEFA/56. 
54. In early 1953, Nehru agreed to consult the State Government on frontier appointments. NMML, 
Medhi Papers, S.F. No.2. 
55. Delhi, NMML, Rustomji Papers (1962), Correspondence as Adviser to Governor of Assam and 
Dewan of Sikkim (1953-62), S.No.3., Handing over note by TN Kaul. 
56. Delhi, NMML, APCC Papers (1956), Sadiya District Congress Committee, 1955-56, Packet 23, File 
No.12., Mishmis to Nehru, 11 December 1955 (pp.20-23). 
57. New Delhi, NMML, APCC Papers (1956), Re-organisation Commission, 1954-56, Packet 98, File 
No.10., Representation by the All Assam Miri Sanmilan, 18 May 1955 (pp.118-21). 
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isolation. In the process, state-building contributed to the creation of North-East India, a 
fragmented region impossibly divided into territorial 'homelands' based on exclusive claims to 
indigeneity (Baruah 2008, 15-19), whose relationship to India is marked by enduring alienation 
and which occupies a marginal place in the country's 'national imaginary' (Tillin 2007, 58; 
Sonwalkar 2004).  
While it does show that the Nehruvian developmental state was both at the forefront and the 
centre of the refashioning of a post-colonial identity, NEFA's story tells us that this identity was 
not necessarily ‘nation-statist’ (Roy 2007, emphasis mine). Indeed, here state-making could go 
without nation-building, when it was not at odds with it. The crystallisation of the hills/plains 
divide on the NEFA-Assam border eventually became the source of important conflicts between 
the two after Arunachal Pradesh's creation (Bhattacharya 1995). Rather than the nationalisation 
of a frontier space (Baruah 2007a, 34), the integration of NEFA under Nehru through the 'magic 
bullet' of development (Baruah 2007b, 17) was a process engaging the state and the local people 
in a tight embrace, but one that sidelined the nation. 
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